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Introduction
Psychology And Psychiatry In The Law
J. Clark Kelso*
We see in the law, both in the statute books and the case
reporters, a reflection of ourselves and our society. As society
changes and the forces at work in society find their way into
legislative offices and the courts, the law evolves to meet new
demands and to exploit new solutions. Change in the law occurs
slowly, however, in part because lawyers are, by training, resistant
to quick fixes, and, in part, because lawyers recognize, perhaps
better than others, that there are usually two or more sides to every
problem.
The articles in this colloquium deal with the legal system's
responses to developments in the sciences of psychology and
psychiatry. A person not well versed in the dynamics of our legal
and political system might suppose that developments in science
are taken up by the courts and by the legislatures with enthusiastic
endorsement. That is not the case. Courts, in particular, have
traditionally been careful to insure that scientific claims to truth
receive appropriate scrutiny before being accepted in the
courtroom.
The debate surrounding the courts' reliance upon the scientific
opinions of psychiatrists and psychologists reflects in part a more
fundamental problem which courts face: How can the courts, which
need expert assistance to decide certain disputes, determine which
experts to rely upon and which of many conflicting theories to
believe? The very fact that courts need experts suggests that courts
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
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lack the judgment to choose between conflicting expert opinions.
If the experts cannot agree, how can courts know who to believe?
Part I of this introduction addresses this question as a prelude to
the more focused inquiry explored by the articles in this
colloquium.
I. EXPERTISE AND THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS
Courts have as their primary function the resolution of disputes.
For better or worse, courts predominately employ an Aristotelian
model of dispute resolution.' In this model, our rules of law serve
as major premises and factual determinations serve as minor
premises in a series of syllogisms that lead, ultimately, to a binary
choice: plaintiff wins or plaintiff loses; or, defendant is found
guilty or defendant is found not guilty. Courts, particularly courts
of equity, occasionally engage in half-measures that deviate
somewhat from this Aristotelian model, but the deviations are much
more the exception than the rule.
Expertise may be necessary to courts both in framing the major
premises, the rules, and in determining the minor premises, the
facts. Courts rely primarily upon judges-which means, in the
overwhelming number of cases, those who are trained in the
law-to supply expertise in choosing the correct major premises to
use in resolving the dispute. In the vast majority of cases, judges
exercise expertise by selecting the correct rule from one of many
rule-sources (e.g., statutes, regulations, cases, respected
commentators, and so forth).
The process of rule selection-deciding whether a particular rule
applies to a particular case-will, in many cases, be straightforward.
When a defendant in California has been accused of murder, the
court knows that the defimition of murder found in California Penal
Code section 187 will be used as a necessary step in the series of
syllogisms leading to a finding of guilt or innocence.
1. Other forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation or negotiation, may draw upon
different paradigms of reasoning. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother New of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L REv. 754 (1984).
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In some cases, however, the selection of the right rule is not so
clear. For example, does a statute which prohibits the serving of
liquor to a visibly intoxicated person supply the appropriate
standard of care for use in a negligence action brought by a person
who was attacked by the visibly intoxicated patron?2 Resolution of
this purely legal question invokes the expertise of the judge in
determining the purposes of the liquor law, the purposes of the law
of negligence, and whether these various purposes would be
undermined or furthered by application of the statutory standard to
the negligence determination.
In the typical case, the judge relies only upon his or her own
expertise (or the expertise of the other branches of government) in
choosing or framing the appropriate rule. It is a relatively rare case
in which a judge significantly relies upon non-governmental,
external expertise in framing a rule of law. A good example of a
rule of law born of external expertise is found in the Supreme
Court of Washington decision in Helling v. Carey,3 where the
court held that an ophthalmologist fell below the standard of
reasonable care as a matter of law by failing to administer a
pressure test for glaucoma to a patient who was under fourty years
of age (the age at which routine tests for glaucoma were
recommended by ophthalmologists).4 The more typical judicial
response to such scientific issues has been to treat them as
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder based upon a
presentation of evidence (which may include expertise supplied by
expert witnesses).5
External expertise is of course much more likely to be
employed by the courts in determining the existence of the minor
premises that are necessary to complete the series of syllogisms.
Very nearly all of the minor premises-the facts-must be introduced
2. See, e.g., Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp., 488 P.2d 436 (Or. 1971).
3. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
4. Xd at 983.
5. For example, many courts would have treated Helling as raising a fact question for the
jury to be resolved by expert testimony regarding the customs of ophthalmologists in Washington.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The TJ. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEG. STuD. 1 (1992).
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to the court from external sources. Some facts are so generally
agreed upon that courts will accept their truth as a matter of
judicial convention, and in a sense, courts no longer need consult
external sources to establish or rely upon such facts (e.g., that the
force of gravity exists and on Earth exerts a force of 32 feet per
second upon objects). 6 Events which take place in the courtroom
itself (for example, conduct which amounts to contempt of court)
may be another example of facts that can be established without
resort to external sources.
Except for these few extraordinary cases, however, courts rely
upon external sources to assist in establishing the facts. Most
commonly, the external sources are people who have some first-
hand knowledge about the events which gave rise to the dispute.
Early in the history of our jury system, jurors were sometimes
chosen precisely because they knew something about the subject
matter of the dispute.7 It has been several hundreds years now,
however, that jurors have generally been excluded from service if
they knew too much about the events giving rise to the dispute or
the subject matter of the dispute. Jurors are now supposed to learn
about the events entirely from evidence presented in the
courtroom.8
Because the jury's factual determinations are supposed to be
derived almost entirely from the evidence which is presented in the
courtroom, one of the most critical issues for the entire process of
courtroom dispute resolution is: What type of evidence will the
courts permit the jury to hear, see, smell, touch or taste? As a
general matter, we should formulate rules of evidence that permit
the introduction of information which will, in more cases than not,
assist the trier of fact to make the "right" or "most accurate"
determination of the facts. By the same token, we should generally
6. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDwARD J. IMIwNKEUED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENcE, § 1-2,
at 3-7 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 414 (1952); Learned
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 50,
51-52 (1912).
8. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244, at 424-425 (4th ed. 1992).
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exclude the introduction of "unreliable" or "untrustworthy"
evidence.
The words "reliable" and "trustworthy" must be put in quotes
to indicate that courtroom reliability may differ quite substantially
from what we mean in ordinary language by the words reliable and
trustworthy. For example, empirical study has for some time
suggested that eyewitness identifications may be quite unreliable in
particular circumstances. Yet, eyewitness identification testimony
is virtually always admitted, and the majority of courts to consider
the issue have even excluded expert testimony which would
educate the jury about the various factors that make eyewitness
identification testimony unreliable and statistics showing a very low
correlation between eyewitness testimony and reality.9
As a general matter, courts take the view that first-hand
testimony-testimony from someone who has personal knowledge
of the subject matter about which they are testifying-is more
reliable than second-hand testimony. This view is commonly
expressed in law by the general rule forbidding the introduction
into evidence of hearsay."0
The rule forbidding hearsay is, as every lawyer knows, riddled
with exceptions, including a catch-all exception that courts may
resort to when no more specific exception applies." As a
generality, the exceptions reflect a decision that evidence which
falls into one of the listed categories is, more often than not, likely
to be sufficiently reliable to be put before the trier of fact. Thus,
for example, we believe that business records kept in the ordinary
course are, in most cases, reliable. 2 We believe, probably with
less justification, that excited utterances are sufficiently reliable to
warrant their admissibility.13
9. See GLANNELLI & IMWINKELREm, supra note 6, § 9-5, at 289-95.
10. FED. R. Evm. 801. McCormick points out that the hearsay rule and the rule requiring first-
hand knowledge are conceptually and historically related, yet distinct. MCCORMICK, supra note 8,
§ 247, at 429. Although the rules are somewhat different, for purposes of this discussion, the two
rules, both of which express a judicial concern with the reliability of evidence, may be treated as one.
11. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(24).
12. Id 803(6).
13. Id 803(2).
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol 24
The reliability exception to hearsay is particularly important
when it comes to the introduction into evidence of a large and
apparently growing category of second-hand testimony: the
testimony of the expert witness. Recognizing that the world is a
complex place and that the interpretation of events in the world
may require specialized knowledge, courts have permitted properly
qualified experts to present to the trier of fact their expert opinions
or interpretation of events.'4
What makes the second-hand opinion of an expert reliable (or,
at least, more reliable than the opinion of a non-expert, which is
generally excludable)? Why do the courts trust self-styled experts?
The practical answer is that dispute resolution simply could not go
on without the use of experts. In our system, judges are generally
expert only in the law and in dispute resolution, and the expert jury
was discarded long ago. When the critical issue in a case is "how
fast was the car going when it went through the intersection," and
there exists a long skid mark prior to impact, refusing to employ
the services of an expert in accident reconstruction would be folly.
The question is not whether to employ experts. Everyone agrees
that experts are a necessary feature of sensible dispute resolution.
The more important questions are (1) Who will be permitted by
courts to assume the mantle of "expert"? and (2) How much
objective substantiation, if any, will courts require experts to
provide in support of their opinions?
Both of these questions spring from the same concern about
experts and expert opinion: How do we really know that the
testimony being given by a person who claims to be an expert has
sufficiently increased reliability to justify an exception to the
court's usual reluctance to permit hearsay and second-hand
testimony? This general concern relates, in turn, to a broader
philosophical debate about the validation or acceptance of scientific
theories. Why do we as a society believe some theories and reject
others? What is it about a particular theory that commands
attention? How do new and sometimes revolutionary theories
displace the accepted wisdom?
14. i 701-706.
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These questions have been much debated by philosophers of
science. For purposes of this introduction, the philosophical views
can conveniently be separated into two camps: the objectivists and
the politicians. The objectivists include a large number of
philosophers of science who have significant disagreements among
themselves. For example, Sir Karl Popper, who believed that a
theory could properly be described as scientific only if it was
possible to prove the theory false, is ordinarily not included in the
same category of scientific philosophers as P.A.M. Dirac or
Leibniz, who tested scientific theories against ideal qualities such
as simplicity, beauty, and elegance.15 The link between these
otherwise disparate philosophies is their reliance upon an objective
measure--something other than counting scientific heads--to
determine the reliability or validity of a particular scientific theory.
The politicians--and, again, this single category includes several
different sub-groups--generally focus more upon the social
dynamics of the scientific community in determining the
acceptance or validity of a scientific theory.'6 At its extreme, the
political view of science holds that a theory will be accepted if, and
only if, the "leaders" of the scientific community accept the theory.
The most significant step in gaining credibility, then, is to convince
acknowledged leaders that the theory (or new field) is indeed
credible.
Although there has been precious little acknowledgment of this
philosophical debate by the courts, it appears that our judicial
approach to acceptance and validation is much closer to the
political model than to the objectivist model. Under Federal Rules
of Evidence 702, a witness can qualify as an expert "by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education." Holding the requisite
degrees virtually guarantees qualification as an expert under Rule
702."7 Courts thus rely upon the politics of education as a sign of
15. See generally SIR KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (2d ed. 1965); GEORGE
GALE, THEORY OF SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, LoaIC, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 199, 209-10 (1979).
16. See GALE, supra note 15, at 227-33.
17. DAvID W. LoursE.LL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 3 FEDERAL EvIDENC E § 381, at 634
(1979).
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acceptance and expertise. Courts have watered-down the political
theory of science by not even requiring experts to be leaders in
their field." In the courtroom, everyone with a degree is a
possible "leader."
The only other threshold limitation sometimes placed upon
expert testimony comes from Frye v. United States,19 where the
cout of appeal held that scientific evidence must be of a sort
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.2" What
is "generally accepted," and how general acceptance may be
proven, remains somewhat unsettled,21 but the temptation to count
heads (and to count certain heads as more significant than others),
appears to be irresistible.
It is easy to understand why courts would favor the political
model of scientific validity. The reason that courts need expertise
is precisely because courts are incapable of themselves evaluating
and interpreting complex events in the world. But in order to
employ the objectivist model in judging the validity of a theory, the
judge must have sufficient expertise to measure the theory against
the objective standard, and the objective standard itself is part and
parcel of the scientific endeavor. If the courts knew enough about
science to use an objective standard, the courts would have enough
expertise to dispense altogether with outside experts. As a
consequence, courts have no choice but to rely upon an essentially
political model in assessing the reliability of scientific testimony.
The consequence of courts adopting the political model of
scientific validity has been the creation of a substantial gap
between what mainstream science and many scientists believe
counts in the world and what courts believe counts as science in
the courtroom. Peter Huber's wonderfully readable book, Galileo's
18. Id. § 381, at 638.
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id. at 1014. There remains an issue whether Frye survived the enactment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. Louisell & Mueller, supra note 17, § 382, at 645-46.
21. Linda E. Carter, Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in
California: Retire Kelly-Frye and Return to a TraditionalAnalysis, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1108
(1989).
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Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, reveals the size of that
gap, both historically and in the courtroom of the present.22
In an age when disputes are increasingly complex and the
resolution of disputes depends more and more upon scientific
developments, courts must make a special effort to keep up with
the times. By employing primarily political criteria to judge the
reliability of scientific theories, courts risk earning the contempt of
the scientific community and, ultimately, the public. The pages of
this colloquium issue set a good example for the way in which
courts should approach scientific issues. Courts must learn to
accept the conclusions of science on their own terms and must
avoid the temptation to restate scientific conclusions in legal terms
that conceal the subtleties of the underlying science. Courts must,
in a phrase, use science judiciously, not as a panacea for all of
society's ills and not as a convenient method for abdicating the
responsibility of making delicate policy decisions.
II. PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY AS EXPERT SYSTEMS
The debate over the judicial use of expertise in psychiatry and
psychology comes down, in many respects, to the philosophical
problem identified above. Why should courts place special trust in
the views of psychiatrists and psychologists? Are the claims which
psychiatrists and psychologists make entitled to the legimitizing
label of "science"? And how can courts use the sometimes tentative
conclusions reached in psychiatry and psychology within a system
that appears to demand all-or-nothing determinations? The debate
continues in the pages of this special issue.
Thomas Szasz's short essay, Psychiatry and the Denial of
Evil, reminds us that, even assuming the scientific validity or
acceptance of current scientific dogma,- there remains to be
answered a moral and policy question about the legal significance
of scientific dogma. For example, even if science may view a
human being as a complex biological machine and may view the
human brain as a complex part of that complex machine, society
22. See also Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAt. U. L. REV. 723 (1992).
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may nevertheless continue to treat the actions of a human being as
the actions of a morally independent agent. Thus, whether we
choose as a society to hold a person legally responsible for their
actions may be answered only partly by the sciences of psychiatry
and psychology.
The Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Revisited, authored by
Professor Ralph Slovenko, traces the history of society's efforts to
treat the mentally ill and identifies the most significant events in
the development of psychiatry as an independent field of science.
It is too easy to forget sometimes that scientific disciplines are in
a constant state of development and flux. Slovenko reminds us of
that reality in his description of the significant revolutions in the
history of psychiatry. The article provides an historical backdrop
against which the judiciary's reliance upon psychiatry may
profitably be judged.
The remaining articles in the issue may conveniently, albeit
somewhat artificially, be separated into two categories: (a) Those
articles dealing primarily with substantive law which has been
influenced by psychiatry and psychology, and (b) the use of
psychiatrists and psychologists as experts in trials.
A. Psychiatry, Psychology and Substantive Law
The use of the insanity plea as a defense in criminal trials
remains controversial. Successful and highly publicized insanity
pleas, such as the so-called "twinkie defense" in the killing of San
Francisco supervisor Harvey Milk and John Hinckley's acquittal of
the charge of attempting to assassinate the President, trigger a sense
of outrage among some and force us to reconsider both the moral
and modem psychiatric underpinnings of a plea that can be traced
at least as far back as the Bible and traditional Hebrew law. In The
Insanity Verdict, The Psychopath, and Post-Acquittal Confinement,
Professor Abraham L. Halpem continues his long-standing
criticisms of the insanity defense, emphasizing in this piece the
pressure which the insanity defense places upon psychiatry and
psychology to ignore good medicine and science in order to satisfy
a public demand for post-acquittal confinement. He makes a case
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for the proposition that acquittees are routinely confined long past
the time when such confinement is medically necessary solely to
satisfy the public demand for retribution.
The next article, Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of
Tarasoff, by D. L. Rosenhan, Terri Wolff Teitelbaum, Kathi Weiss
Teitelbaum, and Martin Davidson, is a good example of the
adverse consequences which may follow when a court fashions a
rule of law that ignores the limits of science. The Supreme Court
of California, in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,"
imposed upon mental health professionals a duty to warn or protect
third persons whose physical safety had been threatened by the
therapist's patient, notwithstanding the nearly unanimous view of
the profession regarding the near impossibility of accurately
predicting a patient's dangerousness to others. The article reports
the results of a recent survey showing that many psychologists
have in fact altered their treatment methodology to reduce the risk
of liability created by the Tarasoff decision.
Robert F. Schopp's article, Justification Defense and Just
Convictions, contains a thorough reconsideration and critique of
justification defenses to criminal offenses, particularly focusing
upon the proper treatment of the defense of duress. The article
reminds us that our views about criminal responsibility may be
subtly influenced by our views regarding free will and the ability
of human beings to remain free agents even against serious threats
to our own safety or happiness.
Returning to civil law developments, in What A Difference A
Day Makes: Age Presumptions, Child Psychology, And The
Standard Of Care Required Of Children, Lisa Perrochet and Ugo
Colella draw upon research into child development and psychology
to support a fundamental reconsideration of the standard of care
which some courts have used to judge the conduct of children in
negligence cases. Perrochet and Colella highlight recent research by
cognitive psychologists that even very young children are able to
recognize cause and effect relationships, recognize themselves as
23. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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causal actors, and are able to exercise self-regulation. They then
criticize those courts which have adopted bright-line rules that
children under a particular age (e.g., seven or five) are incapable
of negligence. The article is a good example of how developments
in psychiatry and psychology can properly be relied upon by courts
in fashioning rules of law.
B. Psychiatrists and Psychologists as Trial Experts
The gap between "true" science and "courtroom" science is
made most clear in John E.B. Myers' article entitled Expert
Testimony Describing Psychological Syndromes. Professor Myers,
himself a leading expert on the use of expert testimony in litigation
involving children,24 identifies several of the most common errors
made by courts and attorneys in dealing with testimony about
syndromes.
Just as psychiatrists and psychologists have been used (and
some would say misused) in the determination of sanity in the
criminal context, psychiatric and psychological testimony has
become a central feature in child dependency proceedings arising
out of allegations of child mistreatment or abuse. In Big Mother:
The State's Use of Mental Health Experts in Dependency Cases,
Professor George J. Alexander reviews the use of expert testimony
in this context, and concludes that such testimony has largely been
misused by the courts which, desperate to make their
determinations more than a roll of the dice, often accept psychiatric
or psychological testimony that promises much more in the way of
reliability than the science can actually deliver.
In the final article in this colloquium, Scientific Jury Selection
and the Equal Protection Rights of Venire Persons, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski treats us to a discussion of sociological and
psychological methods used in the exercise of peremptory
challenges and whether those methods could survive equal
24. See generally JoHN E.B. MYERs, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
(1992); John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Ligitation, 68 NaB. L. REv.
1 (1989).
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protection scrutiny under recent Supreme Court decisions. Among
other things, the article reminds us that considerations of public
policy and constitutional law may sometimes override what appear
to be perfectly valid empirical conclusions and scientific truths.
IM. CONCLUSION
The editors have successfully solicited a wide range of articles
on psychiatry, psychology and the law, covering criminal, quasi-
criminal and civil actions, including substantive and evidentiary
issues, and encompassing both sympathetic and hostile points of
view. I hope readers will, upon completing the issue, join the
continuing debate over what remains a particularly controversial
reliance by courts upon scientific expertise.

